Worker poaching in a supply chain: Enemy from within?

Evan Barlow, Gad Allon and Achal Bassamboo

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 5, 695-709

Abstract: Worker poaching represents the primary mode by which workers change employers. We examine worker poaching between firms linked in a value chain. We find that, in a value chain, the less productive firm may offer its workers higher wages and poach workers from the more productive firm. We also find that worker flows accomplished via poaching impact supply chain management: (a) the identity of the bottleneck firm may depend on whether poaching is available; (b) poaching between linked firms may benefit both, and (c) the value chain cannot be fully coordinated without controlling wages in the labor market.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3130

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:5:p:695-709

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