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Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value

Kerstin Lopatta, Thomas Kaspereit and Laura‐Maria Gastone

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 5, 800-826

Abstract: We show that CEOs' contribution to SG&A cost asymmetry is associated with lower shareholder value. CEO‐related excess SG&A cost stickiness of CEOs with compensation less tied to shareholder value creation and high power drive this association. Last, we provide first evidence that cost asymmetry incorporates a harmful element to the firm and shareholders, namely CEO‐related excess SG&A cost asymmetry.

Date: 2020
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