Vertical integration and first‐mover advantages in environmental taxes

Juan Carlos Bárcena‐Ruiz and María Luz Campo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 6, 1033-1039

Abstract: This paper analyzes whether vertical integration between firms and suppliers encourages governments to behave as leaders in environmental policies. To study this issue, we consider transboundary pollution and two countries, with one firm in each country. We find that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental taxes depends on two factors: whether firms are vertically integrated or not and the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill takes an intermediate value, taxes are set sequentially under vertical integration, but they are set simultaneously without it.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3157

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:6:p:1033-1039

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