Supply chain finance: A three‐party decision model with suppliers' guarantees for retailers

Bo Yan, Kun Luo, Li‐Feng Liu, Yan‐Ru Chen and Yi‐Fan Yang

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 7, 1174-1194

Abstract: Under the premise that financing constraints frequently occur in the supply chain, this paper investigates the financing model of the supplier providing guarantee for the retailer under symmetric and asymmetric information. The optimal solutions of the retailer, the supplier, and the bank are studied by using the Stackelberg game. Results show that increasing the supplier's guarantee proportion can effectively improve the bank's reasonable margin rate and increase the supplier's profit. Under the condition of asymmetric information, the bank can increase the probability of credit loan in the supply chain by reducing the cost of spot check and setting up a reasonable fine limit.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3164

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:7:p:1174-1194

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