Endogenous research and development spillovers and asymmetric firms
Joanna Poyago‐Theotoky and
Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joanna Poyago-Theotoky
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 7, 1282-1286
We examine an asymmetric research and development (R&D) duopoly, where firms differ in their research and development productivity, one firm being technologically advanced. We find that both firms can benefit and increase their profitability by entering into a voluntary information sharing agreement despite their asymmetry and highlight the conditions needed for such an agreement to take place.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:7:p:1282-1286
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