Information‐disclosing strategies of third‐party sellers on retail platforms

Yongrui Duan, Xiaoman Ruan and Chen Chen

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 3, 718-730

Abstract: In this paper, we consider whether third‐party sellers on retail platforms are willing to disclose additional information to facilitate consumers' decision‐making process. Interestingly, we find that even when the additional information is unfavorable to sellers, sellers may still have the incentive to disclose such information, since disclosing additional information can lower consumer uncertainty and alleviate price competition, which can benefit sellers. We also show that when the consumer uncertainty is low enough after one seller discloses additional information, prices of both products are higher than in the case when no seller discloses additional information.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3413

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:3:p:718-730

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