Differential decision analysis of transboundary pollution considering the participation of the central government

Fangju Jia, Dong‐dong Wang, Kun Zhou and Lianshui Li

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 6, 1684-1703

Abstract: In response to the failure of traditional administrative methods to manage transboundary polluted areas, this study uses Stackelberg game theory to construct a three‐party dynamic game model from the perspective of government participation. The results show that the central government will only subsidize local governments when the environmental benefits obtained reach a certain threshold, prompting the local governments to increase pollution control efforts to improve environmental benefits. From the perspective of pollutant emission reduction and environmental benefits, the collaborative governance model is superior to both spontaneous governance and the central government‐led model. Finally, the validity of the conclusion is verified.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3480

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:6:p:1684-1703

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