Research on enterprises emission reduction technology innovation strategies with government subsidy and carbon trading mechanism

Qunli Wu, Xinxin Xu and Ye Tian

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 6, 2083-2097

Abstract: This paper establishes a differential game model to explore the interaction strategies among the government and supply chain enterprises under carbon trading mechanism and subsidies. By applying the principle of optimal control, we obtain the optimal solutions of the government and supply chain players with different scenarios. Research findings indicate that without cost‐sharing, the decision types between enterprises do not affect the low‐carbon technology (LCT) innovation level and subsidies. However, with a cost‐sharing contract, the emissions strategies of the supply players are achieved Pareto optimal. Specially, for government regulation, only when the proportion of cost‐sharing between enterprises reaches a reasonable range can government regulation make the better effect.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3510

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:6:p:2083-2097

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().