Pricing leadership decisions of competing firms with consumer learning
Zibin Cui and
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 6, 2326-2346
We consider two competing firms that sell two quality‐differentiated products over two periods, in which the high‐ or low‐quality firms have the option to act as a pricing leader or follower in the first or second periods. Two groups of consumers make their purchase decisions in the first or second periods, with the former consumers using the experience available to the latter from online communities (e.g., TikTok). Our analysis indicates that competition intensity and consumers' reviews are two interacting forces that steer the equilibrium decisions of the two competing firms.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:6:p:2326-2346
Access Statistics for this article
Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes
More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().