Silent but deadly: Political corruption and voluntary ESG disclosure in the United States

Khanh Hoang

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 7, 2775-2793

Abstract: This paper investigates the impacts of political corruption and carbon risk on corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. As there has not been a law to enforce ESG disclosure in the United States, ESG disclosure remains on a voluntary basis regardless of the growing attention from market participants and society. Using a sample of US listed firms and state‐level corruption data during 2005–2018, the study shows that political corruption affects voluntary ESG disclosure. The empirical results reveal that heavy‐polluter firms benefit from local corruption and less likely to voluntarily disclose their ESG performance compared to their counterparts.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3562

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:7:p:2775-2793

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().