Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis

Gregorio Sánchez‐Marín, María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez, Samuel Baixauli‐Soler, Brian G.M. Main and Antonio Mínguez‐Vera

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 7, 2817-2837

Abstract: Literature on executive compensation has relatively neglected the impact of institutional governance contexts. Regarding filling this gap, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms on excess executive compensation comparing a set of listed UK and Spanish firms on an 8‐year panel data. Findings indicate that Spanish firms are characterized by higher excess executive compensation than UK firms because of the less effectiveness of ownership structure and board of directors. Differences in concentration and structure of ownership as well as in composition and size of boards result in more aligned executive compensation design in the UK firms.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3564

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:7:p:2817-2837

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().