Negotiation and bargaining power in the determination of administrative wages in academe
João Ricardo Faria,
Steven B. Caudill,
Daniel Gropper and
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 7, 2935-2940
We develop a sequential game representing bargaining between a public university and a professor over a vacant administrative position, such as an academic deanship. We find that the administrative salary is an increasing function of the job candidate's salary, the prior dean's salary, the price of undergraduate courses, elasticity of the wage differential, and faculty productivity. The game also indicates that if the new dean is female or minority, and if the previous dean's salary is important, then one can conclude that the professor is able to circumvent wage discrimination given that the salaries of public university officials are publicly available.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:7:p:2935-2940
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