Horizontal partial shareholding, dual purpose concern, and mixed duopoly competition

Pin Zhou and Hong Hong

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 7, 3107-3115

Abstract: This paper investigates the combined effect of horizontal partial shareholding and dual purpose concern on quantity competition. We identify the type of acquiring firm on production quantity, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The results show that the combined effect may accelerate competition or mitigate competition, which depends on the trade‐off between the competition‐softening effect of horizontal partial shareholding and competition‐intensifying effect of dual purpose concern. Whether the consumer and society benefit from the combined effect also depends on the magnitude of horizontal shareholding and socialresponsibility preference.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3584

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:7:p:3107-3115

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