Much ado about diversity? The perpetuation of old elites on corporate boards

Stefan Schmid and Felix Roedder

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 8, 3263-3285

Abstract: Despite ubiquitous diversity pledges, many corporate boards still closely resemble those of the past, in that they are largely composed of directors with distinct elite backgrounds. Our study asks why some firms have more elite boards than others. We draw on elite theory and organizational change and stability literature to argue that the elite's inherent propensity to self‐perpetuate is stronger in firms that are characterized by stability. Our empirical results, based on a Japanese sample, support our claim. We add to the debate on board composition by concluding that the old elite is likely to retain its importance in the future in firms that provide a suitable setting for its perpetuation.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3601

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:8:p:3263-3285

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().