Patent disclosure strategies of companies participating in standard setting: Based on government regulation perspective

Junjun Hou, Ya Hou and Zijin Li

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 8, 3987-3995

Abstract: The patent entry standard raises the technical level, but it also sparked discussion on patent strategic. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model by introducing a supervisory mechanism and conducts simulations to study patent strategy of enterprises participating in standard setting. Moreover, empirical is used to test opportunistic motive. This paper finds that pre‐regulation and post‐punishment have key effect on the equilibrium. With the strengthening of supervision, the system tends to converge on the results of prior disclosure. Companies participating in national standard setting have opportunistic motive to patent applications. The paper enriches the research of intellectual property in standardisation.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3641

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:8:p:3987-3995

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