Optimal joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a retailer‐led supply chain

Fei Tang, Ying Dai and Zu‐Jun Ma

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 1, 399-415

Abstract: This study investigates the joint trade‐in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade‐in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade‐in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade‐in rebate decisions can achieve win‐win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade‐in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade‐in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.

Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3689

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:1:p:399-415

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().