How and when female directors effectively cut down acquisition premiums

Mi‐Hee Lim and Ji‐Hwan Lee

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 1, 84-101

Abstract: Grounded upon the group dynamics and the human capital literature, this paper proposes that the presence and conditions of female directors on a board substantially affect the acquisition decision. In detail, it argues that female board representation decreases the acquisition premium offered. It also examines the effects of female directors are contingent upon their conditions. When the females are inside, rather than outside, directors, their influence is greater. When the female directors have more prior acquisition experiences than male directors, the negative impact on premiums is strengthened, particularly when their acquisition experiences are those accumulated at acquirers rather than at targets. Empirical analyses on a sample of 1750 acquisitions made by US public firms in 2003–2013 provide evidence to support our predictions.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:1:p:84-101

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