Design of a river chief incentive mechanism based on blockchain: A principal–agent model

He Chang, Huimin Liu and Shuai Jin

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 3, 1534-1546

Abstract: Information asymmetry caused by centralized databases is the main factor hindering the improved performance of river chief governance, and blockchain can solve this dilemma. In view of the mismatch between traceable feature of blockchain and the heavy punishment mechanism, a model of river governance was constructed based on principal–agent theory, and an incentive mechanism of river chiefs in the context of blockchain was designed. The results we conducted will enable the real river management information to be stored permanently in the distributed ledger. These measures are conducive to long‐term river management and improve the overall environmental and social benefits.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3763

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:3:p:1534-1546

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