The impact of anti‐corruption on environmental governance efficiency in China: A study based on spatial effect
Hui Hou,
Siwei Yang and
Minghao Zhang
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2023, vol. 44, issue 8, 4452-4465
Abstract:
Anti‐corruption is an important initiative in China's national governance system. The existing literature usually studies the direct impact of corruption or anti‐corruption on China's environment, while few studies show the spatial correlation impact of anti‐corruption on China's environmental governance. This paper redefines anti‐corruption, uses panel data of 30 Chinese provinces and cities from 2005 to 2019, and empirically analyzes the impact of anti‐corruption on environmental governance efficiency in China using spatial Durbin model. The findings indicate that the direct effect of anti‐corruption on environmental governance efficiency is positive, indicating that increasing anti‐corruption efforts will help improve local environmental governance efficiency; indirect effect of anti‐corruption on environmental governance efficiency is negative, suggesting that due to the existence of “pollution heaven” effect, the strengthening of anti‐corruption in the local region will cause polluting industries to move from local region to neighboring regions, leading to serious environmental pollution in the neighboring regions, and then reducing environmental governance efficiency. The indirect effect of economic development, industrial structure, and economic openness are negative, while the indirect effect of urbanization rate and clean energy are positive. The findings of the study provide a theoretical basis and insight for governments at all levels to improve environmental governance efficiency through anti‐corruption.
Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3963
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:44:y:2023:i:8:p:4452-4465
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