Manufacturer's online recycling channel intrusion strategies considering digital technology enabling and government subsidies

Fengmin Yao, Yufei Wang, Yingluo Yan and Shan Liu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 2, 1043-1066

Abstract: We constructed closed‐loop supply chain decision‐making models for digital technology empowerment considering government subsidies and analyzed the interaction between subsidy strategies and digital technology empowerment decisions. We found that when manufacturer does not (does) implement online recycling channel intrusion, government subsidies have (have not) a transmission effect. However, when the government subsidizes manufacturer (recycling platform), channel intrusion will increase (decrease) the digital technology empowerment level of recycling platform. Meanwhile, excessive subsidies for recycling platform are not conducive to remanufacturing. In addition, when consumers' digital sensitivity is weak, government subsidies to manufacturer is more conducive to increasing social welfare.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4050

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:2:p:1043-1066

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