Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of supply chain low‐carbon transformation considering the coupling of carbon tax and subsidy regulations

Liying Yu, Hui Xu and Ziyuan Zhang

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 2, 702-725

Abstract: Considering the coupling of the differential carbon tax and subsidy policies, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model. Then the factors influencing the behavior of each party are analyzed. Results show that the increasing rate of manufacturer income and retailer income when taking low‐carbon strategy can affect their enthusiasm to adopt low‐carbon behavior. In terms of the external regulation, the combination of differential carbon tax policy and subsidy policy can effectively restrain manufacturer's free‐riding behavior and encourage the manufacturer to complete the low‐carbon transformation. However, such policy combination has poor supervision effect on retailer's free‐riding behavior.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4026

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:2:p:702-725

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