Renegotiations after procurement auctions: Coping with supply disruptions due to underestimating costs

Dong Cai, Chunxiang Guo and Kee‐hung Lai

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 4, 2130-2143

Abstract: It is common for suppliers to underestimate costs in procurement auctions, thereby decreasing the bid price and profit on completion of the supply, and potentially resulting in supply disruptions. We study the bidding decisions of suppliers that underestimate costs when the buyer uses first‐price or second‐price sealed‐bid procurement auctions. We study the effects of underestimating costs on the bid prices and performance decisions under different auction modes and propose renegotiations after procurement auctions to cope with supply disruptions. The results show that: (1) using first‐price or second‐price auctions, underestimating costs does not guarantee a positive profit on completion of the supply. When the winning supplier's degree of underestimation is high enough, underestimating costs may cause supply disruptions. (2) When the buyer faces supply disruptions, if the expected payment for re‐selecting another supplier is not less than a certain threshold value, the buyer can prevent supply disruptions through renegotiations after procurement auctions. (3) Compared to the situation where all suppliers' budgeted costs are accurate, underestimating costs always decreases the supplier's profit. For the buyer, when the supplier completes the supply under the original or renegotiated contract, underestimating costs can decrease the procurement costs. Finally, we show the main conclusions with numerical examples.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4115

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:4:p:2130-2143

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