A multiagent collaborative development strategy for environmental pollution liability insurance based on an evolutionary game

Yan Zhao and Ruyan Cheng

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 4, 2443-2458

Abstract: To improve the problem of environmental pollution liability insurance, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on the government, insurance companies, and polluting enterprises. The findings indicate that in an imperfect market, penalty and subsidy mechanisms boost insurance rates. Reinsurance facilitates insurer underwriting, prompting gradual government withdrawal. Effective pricing mechanisms by insurance companies enhance environmental liability insurance operations amid evolving market mechanisms, offering theoretical guidance for addressing challenges in implementing such insurance.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:4:p:2443-2458

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