Non‐state shareholder governance and technological innovations of state‐owned enterprises: The moderating effect of executive compensation incentives

Zhenqing Liu, Linjie Li and Zhibin Zhang

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 6, 3886-3896

Abstract: This study focuses on the impact mechanism of non‐state shareholder governance on technological innovation in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of executive compensation incentives, using listed manufacturing companies of SOEs from 2014 to 2020 as research samples. The research findings indicate that the mere ownership of shares by non‐state shareholders has no significant impact on technological innovation. However, the delegation of executives by non‐state shareholders contributes to enhancing technological innovation in SOEs. So Improving technological innovation in SOEs is a crucial objective in the ongoing deepening and enhancing actions of the new round of state‐owned enterprise reforms.

Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4227

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:6:p:3886-3896

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