 Multi‐agent behavioral strategy game and synergy evolution path of the retired power battery recycling systemZhe Wang, Fan Wu, Wenxi Zhang, Sijia Ke and Xiaobo Wang Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 6, 3993-4011 Abstract: In the era of transitioning to a low‐carbon economy, China's electric vehicle market is experiencing exponential growth, a trend that is mirrored by the burgeoning market for the recycling of used power batteries. This rapid expansion underscores the urgency of enhancing the power battery recycling system. However, the lack of sufficient engagement from consumers and recyclers in the recycling system currently impedes the formation of a cohesive recycling effort. To tackle this issue, we introduce a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recyclers, and consumers. By analyzing the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) and their stability conditions, we delineate the synergetic development paths of them. Numerical examples illustrate the model's effectiveness and explore how government incentive policies can affect the strategic decisions of other participants. Our findings suggest that establishing incentive policies by the government in the early stage of the power battery industry is crucial for fostering a synergetic recycling system that is led by the government, involved by the community, and driven by the market. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:6:p:3993-4011 Access Statistics for this article Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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