EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal innovation incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform

Jianyue Liu, Zhiqiang Ma and Binxin Zhu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2024, vol. 45, issue 6, 4305-4319

Abstract: Lack of incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform has resulted in the loss of patient innovation and the failure in the diffusion of patients' innovations. To solve this problem, we compared four incentive strategies: (i) without incentive, (ii) cost‐sharing incentive, (iii) revenue‐sharing incentive, and (iv) a hybrid incentive strategy combining cost‐sharing and revenue‐sharing. Our analysis indicates that the innovation guidance effect is at its lowest level without incentive strategies, and the hybrid incentive strategy can maximize both innovation enthusiasm and profits. Furthermore, there exists a threshold for revenue‐sharing ratio, making the incentive effect of revenue‐sharing strategy better than that of the cost‐sharing strategy. Finally, short‐sighted thinking among platform participants will reduce the innovation enthusiasm of altruistic patients and the incentive investment of the platform. This study provides guiding principles for the health crowdsourcing platform to regulate online patient innovation solutions.

Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4235

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:6:p:4305-4319

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-13
Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:6:p:4305-4319