How to address enterprise collusion in falsifying carbon emission data: A game theory analysis

Yong Sun, Xinqi Yang, Runtian Wu, Guangxiang Gong and Tianjie Lei

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 1, 378-392

Abstract: Falsification of carbon emissions data poses a significant challenge to the integrity of the carbon trading market. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive strategy involving various stakeholders. This paper focuses on collusive behavior in carbon emissions data falsification. An evolutionary game model is established to illustrate the interactions between local governments, carbon‐emitting enterprises, and third‐party carbon verification agencies. The stability of the evolutionary game and its conditions are analyzed, revealing the impact of regulatory penalties, credit losses, and awareness of responsibility. This study proposes a management framework tailored for this tripartite game, providing valuable insights for policy formulation.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4380

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:1:p:378-392

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