Optimal financing strategies for low‐carbon supply chains: A Stackelberg game perspective

Lei Wang, Lin Zhang and Xiaoli Zhang

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 1, 666-680

Abstract: This study constructs a Stackelberg game model between low‐carbon manufacturers and capital‐constrained retailers. Considering the manufacturer's financing model, the manufacturer's investment model, and the internal blended financing model, it studies the optimal wholesale price of manufacturers. This paper investigates the impact of consumers' low‐carbon preference, the financing interest rate of manufacturers, investment ratio, investment return on carbon emission reduction investment, and supply chain pricing. The conditions for low‐carbon supply chain participants to choose the best financing mode and the impact of different financing models on the performance of low‐carbon supply chains were obtained.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4394

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:1:p:666-680

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