Pricing Strategy of Power Supply Chain Considering Intermittent Generation

Junhai Ma, Weihua Liang and Wenjing Qi

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 3, 1735-1748

Abstract: The impact of weather conditions on renewable energy stability is profound, which amplifies the fragility and security risks of energy systems. The energy storage technology has effectively alleviated the problem of intermittent new energy generation, yet the safety of these systems is pivotal for further adoption of renewable energy. This article establishes Stackelberg and long‐term games for power supplier and energy storage operator dealing with intermittent energy sources. We analyze how the investment in energy storage safety and power supplier scale expansion affect the decisions and profits of both parties in the game. We also visualize the complex phenomena that occur during the long‐term dynamic game process. Results indicate that improved safety performance correlates with increased prices and profits for both energy storage operators and power suppliers. Additionally, enhanced safety accompany the profit margin reduction between these parties. When the probability of high production capacity of renewable energy increases, the electricity price of energy storage operator and power supplier shows a downward trend. In long‐term dynamic games, the stability of electricity price for energy storage operators is higher than that of electricity suppliers.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4446

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:3:p:1735-1748

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