Optimal Product Quality and Live Streaming Introduction Strategy for Brand Owners Considering Information Interaction and Deceptive Promotion
Cuihua Zhang,
Xiangru Zhao and
Henry Xu
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2025, vol. 46, issue 6, 3666-3682
Abstract:
The information interaction features and deceptive promotion phenomena in live streaming e‐commerce significantly influence consumers' purchase decisions, directly affecting brand owners' choices regarding their live streaming strategies. In light of this, the impacts of information interaction and deceptive promotion on the purchase behavior of strategic consumers are considered, and a two‐period model of consumer utility and brand owner profit is constructed under nine optional sales scenarios. By optimizing the equilibrium solutions to models and conducting a comparative analysis, this study explores the impacts of factors such as informative degree, deceptive promotion degree, and penalty costs on the brand owner's optimal strategy of product quality and the selection of live streaming modes (including whether to provide live streaming, when to introduce it, and whether to conduct deceptive promotion during live streaming) under different scenarios. Moreover, the conditions in which the brand owner is more inclined to opt for deceptive promotion strategies are revealed. These findings provide optimal operational strategies for brand owners in live streaming sales while offering support for government and regulatory agencies seeking effective measures to combat deceptive promotion.
Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4551
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:6:p:3666-3682
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