Alternative natural gas contract and pricing structures and incentives for the LNG industry

Emil D. Attanasi

Natural Resources Forum, 1991, vol. 15, issue 3, 190-201

Abstract: Gas conversion to liquefied gas (LNG) and transport by LNG tankers is one option for meeting expanding gas consumption and for gas traded internationally. This paper examines the impact of the traditional gas contract provisions of indefinite pricing, market out price ceilings, and take‐or‐pay requirements on the profitability of LNG projects in the context of markets characterized by price and quantity uncertainty. Simulation experiments are used to examine and calibrate the effects of those provisions. The results provide guidance to operators, host countries and purchasers in structuring such contracts. The paper also assesses prospects of future expansion of world LNG capacity.

Date: 1991
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-8947.1991.tb00133.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:natres:v:15:y:1991:i:3:p:190-201

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