A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game

Michael Maschler

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1966, vol. 13, issue 1, 11-33

Abstract: An inspector's game is a non‐constant‐sum two‐person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.

Date: 1966
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:13:y:1966:i:1:p:11-33

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