An attack‐defense game with matrix strategies

N. D. Cohen

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1966, vol. 13, issue 4, 391-402

Abstract: This paper presents the results and the method of analysis for an attack‐defense game involving allocation of resources. Each player is assumed to have several different types of resources to be divided in optimal fashion among a fixed set of targets. The payoff function of the game is convex. The “No Soft‐Spot” principle of M. Dresher, and the concept of the generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal strategies for each player and the value of the game.

Date: 1966
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:13:y:1966:i:4:p:391-402

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