Some rectangular games with a two‐man team

James R. Jackson

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1967, vol. 14, issue 1, 23-41

Abstract: Certain zero‐sum games are examined in which an individual player is opposed by a two‐man team. The members of the team have identical interests, but must act separately during play. Most of the paper is devoted to instances in which one teammate has an opportunity to communicate to the other about their mutual opponent's strategy; but he may only be able to transmit a limited amount of information and his choice of a “message” may affect the payoff. The team must thus make economically efficient use of a limited communication opportunity. The present paper treats a variety of models, all of which are formulated as rectangular (matrix) games. Related models, some of which cannot be so formulated either because of restrictions on the team's opportunities to use mixed strategies or because they are non‐zero‐sum games, will be treated in another paper.

Date: 1967
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800140104

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:14:y:1967:i:1:p:23-41

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().