Simple stability of general n‐ person games

Ezio Marchi

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1967, vol. 14, issue 2, 163-171

Abstract: Herein are introduced noncooperative points of n‐person games defined on compact and convex sets in a Euclidean space and continuous payoff functions, which are natural extensions of the respective concepts of maximin, minimax strategies and saddle points of two‐person games. The conc:ept of equilibrium point appears as a special of one of those. As a particular case, we examine such points for the mixed extension of finite n‐person games; finally, a related topic is illustrated. These results represent the first installment of a collection which will be continued in subsequent publications.

Date: 1967
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:14:y:1967:i:2:p:163-171

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