Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

James H. Criesmer, Richard E. Levitan and Martin Shubikt

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1967, vol. 14, issue 4, 415-433

Abstract: This paper represents a continuation of three previous papers [1‐.3] in the study of competitive bidding processes. It treats the case where a bidder's knowledge of his competitor's cost i s given by a probability distribution over a certain interval. The results obtained extend the work of Vickrey [4] to the case where the cost intervals a r e not necessarily symmetric.

Date: 1967
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:14:y:1967:i:4:p:415-433

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