Political games

Guillermo Owen

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1971, vol. 18, issue 3, 345-355

Abstract: A modification of the Shapley value is suggested, which takes into account the fact that (due to personal affinities among the players) certain coalitions are more easily formed than others. This is done by assigning to each player a point in space, and looking at the distances between pairs of points. The method seems to be especially applicable to voting games among political parties (in, e. g., parliaments), and, for such games, gives a value which is considerably easier to compute than the usual Shapley value. Some examples are considered.

Date: 1971
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:18:y:1971:i:3:p:345-355

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