A continuous submarine versus submarine game

Eric Langford

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1973, vol. 20, issue 3, 405-417

Abstract: This paper analyzes, from a game‐theoretic standpoint, the simultaneous choice of speeds by a transitor and by an SSK which patrols back and forth perpendicular to the transitor's course. Using idealized acoustic assumptions and a cookie‐cutter detection model which ignores counterdetection, we are able to present the problem as a continuous game, and to determine an analytic solution. The results indicate that with these assumptions, there are conditions under which neither a “go fast” nor a “go slow” strategy is optimal. The game provides a good example of a continuous game with a nontrivial solution which can be solved effectively.

Date: 1973
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:20:y:1973:i:3:p:405-417

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