On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods

Mamoru Kaneko ()

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1976, vol. 23, issue 2, 321-337

Abstract: We consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.

Date: 1976
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:23:y:1976:i:2:p:321-337

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