Characterization of the nucleolus for a class of n‐person games

Guillermo Owen

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1977, vol. 24, issue 3, 463-472

Abstract: An inductive procedure is given for finding the nucleolus of an n‐person game in which all coalitions with less than n‐1 players are totally defeated. It is shown that, for such a game, one of three things may occur: (a) all players receive the same amount; (b) each player receives his quota, plus a certain constant (which may be positive, nerative, or zero); (c) the weakest player receives one half his quota, and the other players divide the remaining profit according to the nucleolus of a similar (n‐1)‐person game. It is also shown that the nucleolus of such a game yields directly the nucleolus of each derived game. An example is worked out in detail.

Date: 1977
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