Systems defense games: Colonel blotto, command and control
Martin Shubik and
Robert James Weber
Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1981, vol. 28, issue 2, 281-287
The classical “Colonel Blotto” games of force allocation are generalized to include situations in which there are complementarities among the targets being defended. The complementarities are represented by means of a system “characteristic function,” and a valuation technique from the theory of cooperative games is seen to indicate the optimal allocations of defense and attack forces. Cost trade‐offs between systems defense and alternative measures, such as the hardening of targets, are discussed, and a simple example is analyzed in order to indicate the potential of this approach.
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Working Paper: Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control (1978)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navlog:v:28:y:1981:i:2:p:281-287
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