Finding saddle points on polyhedra: Solving certain continuous minimax problems

George E. Monahan

Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 1996, vol. 43, issue 6, 821-837

Abstract: This article reviews procedures for computing saddle points of certain continuous concave‐convex functions defined on polyhedra and investigates how certain parameters and payoff functions influence equilibrium solutions. The discussion centers on two widely studied applications: missile defense and market‐share attraction games. In both settings, each player allocates a limited resource, called effort, among a finite number of alternatives. Equilibrium solutions to these two‐person games are particularly easy to compute under a proportional effectiveness hypothesis, either in closed form or in a finite number of steps. One of the more interesting qualitative properties we establish is the identification of conditions under which the maximizing player can ignore the values of the alternatives in determining allocation decisions. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Date: 1996
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https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6750(199609)43:63.0.CO;2-6

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navres:v:43:y:1996:i:6:p:821-837

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