Interchange fees for bank ATM networks

S. H. Gow and L. C. Thomas

Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 1998, vol. 45, issue 4, 407-417

Abstract: Banks have found it advantageous to connect their Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) in networks so that customers of one bank may use the ATMs of any bank in the network. When this occurs, an interchange fee is paid by the customer's bank to the one that owns the ATM. These have been set by historic interbank negotiation. The paper investigates how a model based on n‐player game theory concepts of Shapley value and nucleolus could be used as an alternative way of setting such fees. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 407–417, 1998

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navres:v:45:y:1998:i:4:p:407-417

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