Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

Daniel Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 2012, vol. 59, issue 6, 457-469

Abstract: In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012

Date: 2012
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