Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Tarun Jain, Jishnu Hazra and Jayashankar M. Swaminathan

Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 2019, vol. 66, issue 3, 272-280

Abstract: Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.21838

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:navres:v:66:y:2019:i:3:p:272-280

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