Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case of Yemen

Maria‐Louise Clausen

Public Administration & Development, 2020, vol. 40, issue 2, 119-128

Abstract: Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decentralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy. The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite capture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen has a long tradition for local bottom‐up initiatives and there is widespread internal support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formulation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentralization framework.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:padxxx:v:40:y:2020:i:2:p:119-128

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