Congressional dysfunction: An information processing perspective

Jonathan Lewallen, Sean M. Theriault and Bryan D. Jones

Regulation & Governance, 2016, vol. 10, issue 2, 179-190

Abstract: The public's approval of Congress is at an all time low. The parties seem to have taken the legislative process hostage for their own electoral gain. Whereas traditional arguments about congressional dysfunction focus on polarized voting coalitions or outputs – particularly legislation – in this article we highlight congressional information processing and how it has changed in this highly partisan era. By coding congressional hearings according to the kind of information on which they focus, we find that members of Congress are receiving one‐sided information to a greater degree and are spending less time learning about potential solutions. We use these results to make numerous recommendations for improving how Congress gathers its information.

Date: 2016
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12090

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:2:p:179-190

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