EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The dynamics of doping: Lance Armstrong, the United States Anti‐Doping Agency and the regulatory governance of professional cycling

Hans de Bruijn, Martijn Groenleer and Theo van Ruijven

Regulation & Governance, 2016, vol. 10, issue 3, 284-297

Abstract: On 10 October 2012, the United States Anti‐Doping Agency published an investigative report on the use of performance‐enhancing drugs by professional cyclist Lance Armstrong. The report paints a disconcerting picture of the doping program that Armstrong and his US Postal Service professional cycling team managed to carry out for several years, despite being subject to many inspections. It contains a wealth of unique empirical data, including a large number of affidavits. In this article, we use this data to answer the question of how Armstrong was able to prolong prohibited behavior. In doing so, we focus in particular on the interactions between Armstrong and the many doping inspectors he encountered. Our analysis results in a variety of answers to this question. First, inspectors were confronted with an inspectee who behaved as an “amoral calculator” and acted strategically. The strategies of inspectors were not adequately attuned to such behavior. Second, the team's internal professional control was neutralized by various factors, including its strict hierarchy and the many friendships within the team. And, finally, the environment created strong incentives to start doping and subsequently deny doing so. We argue that the dynamics underlying doping necessitate a combination of measures to regulate the use of performance‐enhancing drugs in the field of professional cycling and beyond.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12085

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:3:p:284-297

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Regulation & Governance from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:10:y:2016:i:3:p:284-297