Temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance: An empirical study

Ittai Bar‐Siman‐Tov

Regulation & Governance, 2018, vol. 12, issue 2, 192-219

Abstract: This article presents the findings of an extensive multi‐method empirical study that explored the relationship between temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. Temporary (or “sunset”) legislation – statutory provisions enacted for a limited time and set to expire unless their validity is extended – is often hailed as a key tool for promoting experimental and better regulation. Despite the importance of temporary legislation and the burgeoning theoretical scholarship on the subject, there is still a dearth of empirical studies about how temporary legislation is used in practice. The lack of empirical evidence creates a lacuna in at least three areas of theoretical scholarship, concerning temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. This paper is a first step to fill this gap.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12148

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:192-219

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