Restraining Gulliver: Institutional reform and the strengthening of state capacity and compliance

Kimberly A. Nolan García and Mark Aspinwall

Regulation & Governance, 2019, vol. 13, issue 3, 321-339

Abstract: Governance in the developing world is fraught with problems of corruption, weak institutions, and inadequate expertise among bureaucrats. Failing to enforce laws and regulations is one way in which these problems manifest themselves. In this paper, we evaluate changes across three institutions charged with oversight or administration of labor justice in Mexico. We find that both autonomy from the executive and professionalization are necessary to improve compliance with labor law over time. Our study shows that professionalization can occur in several ways, including through training, merit hiring, and introducing experienced external administrators. The implications of the study are that reforms that increase the independence and legal authority of oversight institutions should be complemented by efforts to strengthen the professionalism of bureaucrats.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12181

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:reggov:v:13:y:2019:i:3:p:321-339

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